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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy Research Working Paper 5620
Although both domestic and foreign private banks have 
gained ground in MENA in recent years, state banks 
continue to play an important role in many countries. 
Using a MENA bank-level panel dataset for the period 
2001–08, the paper contributes to the empirical literature 
by documenting recent ownership trends and assessing 
the role of ownership and bank performance in MENA 
while accounting for key bank characteristics such as 
size and balance sheet composition. The paper analyzes 
headline performance indicators as well as their key 
drivers and finds that state banks exhibit significantly 
weaker performance, despite their larger size. This result 
is mainly driven by a larger holding of government 
securities, higher costs due to larger staffing numbers, 
and larger loan loss provisions reflecting weaker asset 
This paper is a product of the Financial and Private Sector Development Unit, Middle East and North Africa Region; and 
the Financial Systems Department, Financial and Private Sector Development. It is part of a larger effort by the World 
Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. 
Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted 
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quality. The results reflect both operational inefficiencies 
and policy mandates. The paper also provides a detailed 
performance analysis of foreign and listed banks. 
Foreign banks are fairly new in MENA, yet perform on 
par with domestic banks despite their smaller size and 
higher investment costs. Listed banks exhibit superior 
performance driven by higher interest margins even in 
the face of higher costs associated with listing. Taken 
together, the results do not reject the development role 
for state banks, but do show that their intervention 
comes at a cost. As such, there is scope to reduce the 
share of state banks in some countries and to clarify the 
mandates, improve the governance, and strengthen the 
operational efficiency of most state banks in MENA.0 
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1.  Introduction 
The last three decades witnessed a sharp reduction in the role of state-owned banks (state banks 
for short) in most emerging countries.  The share of state banks in total bank assets declined 
significantly in most regions during this period (Figure 1).  This decline in market shares was 
dramatic  in  the  Eastern  Europe  and  Central  Asian  region,  reflecting  the  transition  from 
communism in the 1990s, but was also impressive in the other regions.  Today state banks 
account on average for less than 50 percent of bank assets in most emerging regions, implying 
that private banks lead financial intermediation in most countries. 
This reduction in the role of state banks reflects a general disappointment with their financial 
performance and contribution to financial and economic development, especially in the countries 
where they dominated the banking system.  In many countries it also reflects a reaction to the 
large fiscal costs associated with their restructuring.  However, despite their loss of market share, 
state banks still play a substantive role in many regions, especially in East Asia, the Middle East 
and North Africa, and South Asia (Figure 1).  In some countries, state banks still lead the process 
of financial intermediation, with market shares above 50 percent of total system assets.  In most 
other countries, state banks do not lead financial intermediation any longer, but still retain an 
important role, with market shares varying between 20 and 50 percent.  In general, state banks 
only seem to play a negligible role in Eastern Europe and Africa.
 1,2 
The arguments that have been put forward to justify the continuing presence of state banks are 
well known.  State banks may address market failures resulting from asymmetric information 
and poor enforcement of contracts that ultimately restrict access to credit by enterprises and 
individuals.  Moreover, they may also provide essential financial services in remote areas, where 
access to finance is constrained by large fixed costs.  Furthermore, state banks can also play an 
important  counter-cyclical  role,  helping  prevent  an  excessive  contraction  of  credit  during  a 
                                                           
1See Clarke, Cull, and Megginson (2005), and Levy-Yeiati, Micco, and Panizza (2007). 
2 The Eastern Europe and Central Asian region is very diverse in this regard.  The average market share of state 
banks is generally negligible in the first group but still large in the second group. 2 
 
financial crisis. This latter argument is not new, but has been reinforced by the recent global 
financial crisis.
3 
These arguments may justify policy interventions in many countries, although it doe s not 
necessarily follow that state banks are the optimal type of intervention.  For example, well -
designed credit guarantee schemes may address information asymmetries more effectively (by 
preserving the leadership role of  private banks) and may also play   a countercyclical role.  
Moreover, even in the cases where the presence of state banks may be justified, policy -makers 
still face the challenge of ensuring clear mandates and sound governance structures in order to 
minimize political interference and avoid credit misallocation and large financial losses  – not a 
trivial task in most countries.  Therefore, the decision of whether state banks should continue 
playing a role in the financial system entails a careful consideration of benefits and costs. In 
making this decision, policy-makers should take into account many factors, including the past 
performance and contribution of state banks in their countries and elsewhere. 
The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is one of the regions where state banks have 
lost market share but still play an important role in many countries.  In the aftermath of the 
recent global financial crisis, policy-makers in these countries have been considering whether 
they should reduce further the role of these banks.  Therefore, an analysis of the performance of 
state banks in the MENA region can provide useful inputs to this decision.  This is precisely the 
main objective of this paper.  We examine the trends in the structures of MENA banking systems 
and assess the performance of state and private banks (domestic and foreign) at the bank level in 
the period 2001-08.  We also examine the association between the listing of banks and their 
performance.    In  doing  so,  we  diminish  omitted  variable  bias  by  controlling  for  bank  size, 
balance sheet structures, and other variables. 
The analysis of trends in the structure of banking systems covers the whole MENA region, while 
the statistical analysis focuses on the nine countries in non-GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) 
area: Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Libya, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, Syria, and Yemen.   We focus 
the statistical analysis on the non-GCC countries because the distinctions between public and 
                                                           
3 Micco and Pannizza (2007) had already shown that credit extended by state banks located in developing countries 
is less pro-cyclical than credit extended by private banks.  See also Levy-Yeiati, Micco, and Panizza (2007).  3 
 
private  ownership  are  more  relevant  and  consequential  in  these  countries  (the  stronger 
interlocking ownership structures in the GCC tend to blur these differences).  
The paper is structured as follows.  The second section reviews the empirical literature on bank 
ownership and performance.  The third section examines recent trends in the structure of banking 
systems in MENA, with focus on ownership patterns.  The fourth section provides a description 
of the dataset.  The fifth section discusses the results from statistical analysis.  This includes two-
group  comparisons  as  well  as  regression  results.    The  sixth  section  discusses  whether  the 
performance of state banks in MENA could be explained by the policy mandates imposed on 
these institutions.  Finally, the sixth section summarizes the main findings and identifies the main 
policy implications. 
2.  Review of the Empirical Literature on Bank Ownership and Performance  
The empirical literature on bank ownership and performance can be divided into three broad 
groups.  The first group examines the financial performance of individual banks controlling for 
ownership and other bank-level characteristics, such as size and balance sheet structures.  The 
second group of empirical studies examines whether state banks contribute positively to financial 
development  and  economic  growth,  a  more  ambitious  and  challenging  objective.    The  third 
group of studies examines the interactions between the actions of state banks and the political 
cycle, to assess the degree of political interference on these institutions.  
One of the main objectives of the first group of studies is to assess whether bank ownership 
affects performance, as measured by profits, margins, costs, and the quality of loan portfolios. 
For example, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2000) focus on foreign ownership and find that 
foreign banks generate higher interest margins and profits, especially in developing countries.  
Micco, Panizza and Yañez (2004) provide a comprehensive analysis of bank ownership and 
performance and conclude that state banks in developing countries tend to have lower profits, 
higher costs, and larger non-performing loans relative to private banks. Foreign banks on the 
other hand are more profitable and have lower costs.   
However, in both this study and a subsequent study (Levy-Yeyati, Micco and Panizza (2007)), 
the authors caution against drawing immediate conclusions from the weak financial performance 
of state banks as it may reflect not only extensive political interference  (e.g. in lending and 4 
 
employment  decisions)  and  operational  inefficiencies,  but  also  their  development  mandates. 
Moreover, the authors do not find a strong correlation between bank ownership and financial 
performance in industrial countries, suggesting that state banks in these countries have been able 
to operate with clearer mandates and sounder governance structures. 
The second line of empirical research is best exemplified by the influential study by La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2002). In this paper, the authors show that higher government 
ownership  of  banks  is  associated  with  slower  subsequent  financial  development  and  GDP 
growth.  Barth, Caprio and Levine (2006) find similar results in a study focused on banking 
regulation.  However, Levy-Yeiati, Micco and Panizza (2007) revisit La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes 
and  Shleifer  (2002)  by  using  more  recent  data,  better  estimation  techniques,  and  additional 
controls and show that the evidence that state bank prevalence lead to lower growth and financial 
development is not strong.  Two recent papers (Korner and Schnabel (2010) and Andrianova, 
Demetriades and Shortland (2010)) reach similar conclusions.  They find a negative relationship 
between a high fraction of public ownership in the banking system and growth when financial 
development and the quality of political institutions are low, conditions that tend to prevail in 
developing countries.  However, similar to Levy-Yeyati et al (2007), they don’t find a negative 
impact of public ownership and growth in developed countries.  They stress that the quality of 
institutions and governance are important in studying the impact of public ownership on growth.   
The third group of studies examines the interactions between credit decisions of state banks and 
the political cycle.  Dinc (2005) uses a large cross-country sample and finds that in election years 
the pace of credit from private banks slows, while the growth of credit from state banks remains 
constant. Cole (2008) finds in the case of India that lending by state banks increases in election 
years. Khwaja and Mian (2005) show that in Pakistan politically-connected firms borrow more 
from state banks and have higher default rates. Sapienza (2004) shows that Italian state banks 
charge lower interest rates in the provinces where the party of the bank’s chairman is stronger. In 
the same line, Micco et al. (2007) find that state financial institutions have lower profitability and 
higher costs than commercial banks and that the gap widens during election years.  
All in all, these studies suggest that while there may be a development role for state banks in 
developing  countries,  state  banks  also  have  to  operate  under  a  more  hostile  institutional 5 
 
environment  in  these  countries.  Extensive  political  interference  in  credit  and  employment 
decisions, blurred mandates, poor governance structures, and severe operational deficiencies may 
eventually outweigh the potential for these banks to address their development mandates and 
contribute to financial and economic progress. Overcoming these institutional weaknesses and 
ensuring  a  supportive  environment  for  state  banks  is  not  a  trivial  task  in  many  developing 
countries.
4 
There is limited research on bank ownership and performance focused  on the MENA region.  
There are some country-level studies (e.g. Omran (2007) for Egypt, Isik, Gunduz and Omran 
(2004)  for  Jordan,  Bennaceur  and  Goaied  (200 1)  for  Tunisia ,  and  Turk-Ariss  (2008)  for 
Lebanon) that examine the overall  efficiency and performance of these banking sectors.  The 
studies with a regional focus tend to  stress specific aspects such as economies of scale (Olson 
and Zoubi (2010)) or institutional aspects such as Islamic banking (e.g. Sufian et al (2008) and 
Ben Khediri and Ben-Khediri (2009)).   The study by Kobeissi and Sun (2010)  is possibly the 
only exception in this regard.  The authors  analyze the impact of ownership structure on bank 
performance in 17 MENA countries, and find that private banks perform better than state banks, 
as measured by higher returns on assets and equity . They also find that the presence of foreign 
banks seems to have a positive impact on the performance of local banks. Moreover, banks listed 
in the stock market are also found to have higher performance rates.   
Our study is similar to Kobeissi and Sun  (2010) in some methodological aspects, but also has 
some important differences.  First, the samples are not identical – while Kobeissi and Sun adopt 
a broad definition of MENA that includes  Iran,  Israel,  Mauritania and  Turkey, we not  only 
exclude  these  countries,  but  also  focus  the  statistical  analysis  in  section  5  on  the  non-GCC 
countries.  As noted before, we focus on the non-GCC countries because the distinctions between 
public and private ownership are more relevant and consequential in these countries.  Second, 
Kobeissi and Sun only focus on measures of profitability, while we explore other measures of 
                                                           
4 In the same vein, Rudolph (2009) analyzes the experience of four state financial institutions in Canada, South 
Africa, Finland and Chile that have performed reasonably well for relatively long periods of time, and examines the 
legal and institutional factors explaining this performance.  Replicating these conditions would require a significant 
policy effort in many developing countries.      
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performance, and make an attempt to explain the differences between the profitability of state 
and private banks from its main determinants, i.e. margins, costs, employment, wages, and loan-
loss provisions. 
3.  Major Trends in Bank Ownership in the MENA Region 
As shown in Figure 2 and Table 1, the overall market share of state banks in MENA declined 
only moderately in the decade, from 41 percent of total assets in 2001 to 33 percent in 2008.  
However, this outcome was essentially due to the stable average share of state banks in the GCC 
countries – around 28 percent of total bank assets during most of this period.  By contrast, the 
average market share of state banks in the non-GCC countries declined significantly – from 56 to 
41 percent of total assets in the same period. 
Within the non-GCC region, two groups of countries can be identified.  In the first group state 
banks play a dominant role (Algeria, Libya, and Syria), while in the second group private banks 
lead  financial  intermediation  (Egypt,  Jordan,  Lebanon,  Morocco,  Tunisia,  and  Yemen).    As 
shown in Figure 2, the average market share of state banks declined by a similar amount in the 
two groups (around 13 percent of total assets), but this decline took place from very different 
initial positions.  In the first group state banks still dominate financial intermediation despite 
their loss of market share (86 percent in 2008), while in the second group private banks have 
generally consolidated their leadership position (71 percent in 2008). 
These averages provide a very useful overview of the overall trends in MENA, but they also 
mask important differences across individual countries.  As shown in Figure 3, most MENA 
countries experienced a decline in the share of state banks during the decade, but the differences 
across countries are significant.  The role of state banks is already modest or negligible in one set 
of countries, including Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, and Oman.  On 
the  other  extreme,  state  banks  still  dominate  financial  intermediation  in  Algeria,  Libya,  and 
Syria, as noted above.  However, it is interesting to note that Syria has made more progress in 
reducing the share of state banks in recent years through the entry of new private banks (there 
has been no major privatization until now), although state banks still play a dominant role with a 
market share of 70 percent of total assets. 7 
 
There is also an intermediate group of countries where the market share of state banks declined 
to 50 percent of total assets or lower levels, but still remains significant.  In these countries state 
banks do not lead the process of financial intermediation any longer but have still retained an 
important role.  These countries include Egypt, the UAE, Qatar, Tunisia, and Morocco.  Note 
that Egypt is included in this group because of recent financial sector reforms that have reduced 
the market share of state banks to about 45 percent of total assets.
5  
Foreign banks have increased their average market share in  the non-GCC region (Figure 3 and 
Table 1), while decreasing slightly in the GCC region.  In the case of the GCC the decline was 
relatively modest (from 26 percent in 2001 to 20 percent in 2008) and offset by an increase in the 
market share of private domestic banks (to yield a stable average share of private banks).  
However,  the  expansion  of  foreign  banks  was  more  significant  in  the  non -GCC  region, 
especially in recent years. The share grew from 8 percent in 2001 to 20 percent in 2008, which is 
almost double the share in 2005. 
There are also some interesting patterns in the two sub-sets of non-GCC countries that are worth 
highlighting.  As shown in Table 1, the share of private banks in the first group of countries (i.e. 
countries where private banks lead) increased initially because of the expansion of domes tic 
banks  but  since 2005  foreign banks  have expanded at a faster pace .   These foreign banks 
represented  20  percent  of  the  system  in  2008  and  are  mostly  international  banks  with 
headquarters outside the region, as opposed to regional banks.   By contrast, the expansion of 
foreign banks in the second group of countries (i.e. countries where state banks lead)  from 1 to 
13 percent of the system in 2001 -08 also accelerated in recent years, but  this expansion  was 
primarily driven by regional banks.  
There was  also a rapid increase in the share of listed banks in both the GCC and non -GCC 
regions, as shown in Figure 5 and Table 1.  For example, in all non-GCC countries, listed banks 
accounted for 56 percent of assets in 2008 compared to 29 percent in 2001.  Some banks decided 
to list for strategic considerations, including the need to access external  funding in order to 
sustain high credit growth, while in other countries this trend was due to regulatory requirements.  
                                                           
5 These reforms included the divestiture of state shares in several joint venture banks and the privatization of Bank 
of Alexandria.    8 
 
In Syria, for example, all new private banks have been required to list, and this explains the rapid 
increase  of  listed  private  banks  in  the  group  of  countries  with  state-led  banking  systems.  
Interestingly, there was also a modest increase in the number and market share of listed public 
banks during this period. 
In sum, state banks lost market share in practically all MENA countries during the last decade.  
The exceptions were those countries where their role was already negligible. However, state 
banks still dominate the banking system in three countries: Algeria, Libya and Syria. There is a 
second group of countries where state banks do not lead anymore but still hold significant shares 
varying from 25 to 50 percent of total assets: Egypt, Qatar, the UAE, Morocco, and Tunisia.  
Foreign banks increased their market share in both the GCC and non-GCC regions. The increase 
was modest in the GCC but more significant in the non-GCC countries. In most countries the 
expansion of foreign banks (both regional and international banks) has been relatively recent and 
many of these banks remain small, as shown below. They seem to occupy specific niches and 
may not yet be able to challenge domestic banks in their main markets.
6 
There was a significant increase in the share of listed banks during the last decade.  Some banks 
seem to have listed to gain easier access to  external funding, while in other cases this increase 
reflected  regulatory  requirements.  Listed  banks  are  usually  subject  to  stricter  corporate 
governance rules and disclosure requirements and are in principle subject to closer scrutiny by 
market participants. The extent to which these outcomes materialize depends on the quality of 
governance rules and  disclosure requirements, their enforcement by regulators,  and effective 
monitoring by capital market institutions.  Finally, we note that few state banks were also listed 
during this period, although the period of listing is too recent and the sample too small to allow 
for any type of statistical testing.  
4.  Data and Methodology 
We adopt a comprehensive, bank-level empirical analysis to assess the association between bank 
ownership and performance in nine non-GCC MENA countries.  In doing so, we proceed along 
                                                           
6 Anzoategui, Martinez Peria and Rocha (2010) show that bank competition in MENA is still weaker than in other 
regions.  This may reflect a variety of factors, including lack of critical mass of private banks in some countries 
(including foreign banks), poor financial infrastructure resulting in weak access of smaller private banks to credit 
information (including foreign banks), and lack of competition from non-banking institutions and markets.   9 
 
two lines.  First, we conduct standard two-group comparison tests and assess whether statistically 
significant differences exist between the relevant bank groups (e.g. state versus private, domestic 
versus foreign, listed versus non-listed).  These statistical tests provide useful initial insights into 
how ownership and bank performance are associated, although they have to be interpreted with 
care, because bank performance is determined by many factors in addition to ownership. 
Therefore, in a second step we turn to bank-level multivariate panel regression analysis in which 
we analyze ownership while simultaneously controlling for various bank characteristics.  For our 
regressions we employ simple Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) on pooled annual bank data for the 
period 2001-08.  Throughout our regressions we also include country- and time-fixed effects to 
mitigate omitted variable bias.  By introducing these fixed effects we aim to control for general 
country conditions to which the banks are exposed throughout the sample years. 
We also account for the possibility that the results could be driven by countries that have a larger 
number of banks.  Therefore, we also conduct regressions where each bank-year observation 
carries a weight that is inversely proportional to the number of banks in its banking system in 
that particular year.  We also relax the independency and homoskedasticity assumptions that are 
required by OLS by reporting three standard errors variations: 1) Huber/White robust standard 
errors and robust standard errors corrected for possible intra-group correlation for which we 
consider 2) a bank- or 3) a country-level grouping of bank-year observations
7. 
Most  of  our  data  are  taken  from  Fitch’s  Bankscope  database  and  include  unconsolidated 
statements  of  commercial  banks  in  MENA.    The  sample  roughly  comprises  600  bank-year 
observations of about 120 banks in 9 countries for the period 2001-08.  As noted before, our 
sample consists of banks in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, Syria, 
and Yemen. Table 3 provides an overview of variable definitions and their sources.  Table 4 
shows pairwise correlations.  Appendix A shows the number of banks for each country by year.  
Our main dependent variables can be grouped into four clusters.  First, we consider general 
profitability and interest-related factors.   We investigate the standard profitability indicators 
Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE).  We use the Net Interest Margin (NIM) to 
                                                           
7 Results for country-level groupings are not reported but are available from the authors upon request.   10 
 
investigate the interest-related side of the business, where NIM is defined as net interest income 
as a fraction of total assets.  We further investigate NIM by dissecting this variable into its two 
drivers – Interest Income to Assets and Interest Costs to Assets. 
Second, we explore efficiency variables.  To capture bank efficiency we use the ratios of total 
Overhead Costs to Assets, and Personnel Costs to Assets.  Further, we break the two cost ratios 
between the underlying quantities and prices by computing the number of Employees per unit of 
Asset and the related average wages. 
Third,  we  study  asset  allocation  to  understand  how  banks  allocate  their  resources  between 
lending and non-lending activities.  We use the Securities to Assets ratio which encapsulates 
many types of securities but is mostly driven by government securities.  As such this ratio also 
measures private sector crowding out effects to some extent. 
Fourth, we examine asset quality and its impact on profitability.  Aggregate country level data 
show that countries that have a large share of state banks also have a high ratio of NPLs to total 
loans (Figure 6). Ideally, we would use this indicator as a measure of asset quality, but we could 
not obtain sufficient bank level data on non-performing loans (NPLs), especially for state banks, 
due to deficiencies in financial disclosure.  In order to capture differences in asset quality and its 
impact on profitability we use the ratio of loan-loss provisions to gross loans.  This indicator 
captures the extent to which banks’ loan portfolios are being contaminated by non-performing 
loans and having an adverse impact on profitability. 
Our explanatory variables include ownership variables which we compiled by using a variety of 
sources including Bankscope, Bankers’ Almanac and individual bank websites.  We classify 
equity holders as being either public or private, or domestic or foreign).  Our public ownership 
dummy  assumes  a  value  of  1  if  the  bank  is  majority  government-owned  and  0  otherwise.  
Similarly, our foreign ownership dummy has a value 1 if the private bank is majority foreign-
owned and 0 otherwise.  We do not differentiate between foreign banks (i.e. regional versus 
international banks) because of small samples.  By conducting the banks’ and exchange website 
searches, we also created a listed dummy variable that assumes a value of 1 if the bank is listed 
on a stock exchange and 0 otherwise. 11 
 
Finally,  in  line  with  other  empirical  studies,  we  also  include  a  number  of  other  bank-level 
variables as controls, including total assets, the ratio of non-interest income to total assets, and 
the ratios of deposits to assets and loans to assets. Total assets capture scale effects, while the 
other variables capture basic differences in the nature and business orientation of the bank.    
5.  Empirical Results 
5.1 Two-group comparison results 
State versus Private Banks 
We start with univariate, two-group comparisons to identify statistically significant differences 
of our dependent variables between ownership types of banks.  The whole sample of non-GCC 
banks in 2008 includes 106 banks, including a group of 16 state banks and 90 private banks.  
Table 5 presents the two-group comparison test results.  We start by documenting that state 
banks are significantly larger than private banks.  This finding is important because bank size can 
have a significant impact on performance through scale economies, particularly on cost ratios. 
We find that private banks are significantly more profitable than public banks in the non-GCC 
region.  On average, private banks have an ROA (ROE) of 0.92 (11.16) percent compared to 
0.52 (7.57) percent for the state banks.  This result is in line with previous research and probably 
reflects a mix of inefficiencies and policy mandates (Micco et al (2004), Levy-Yeiati, Micco and 
Panizza (2007)).  To understand the factors behind the lower levels of profitability we  now 
explore the differences between interest margins, operating costs, and provisions. 
Interestingly, we find that the NIM of state banks is not significantly different from the NIM of 
private banks.  This is due to both lower ratios of interest expenses to assets and interest income 
to assets. That is, state banks enjoy lower funding costs but also generate lower interest income 
per unit of assets.  This result is not surprising since state banks tend to mobilize deposits at a 
lower cost (including lower-yield demand deposits), due to their size, branch network, brand 
name, and implicit government guarantee. At the same time, the lower interest income ratio is 
due to a higher share of government securities and possibly lending to  state enterprises and 
favored sectors at lower rates (this is examined further below).  Note also in this regard that the 
interest income and margins of state banks could be overstated by accrual of interest on non-
performing  loans  to  state  enterprises  and  favored  sectors.    Private  banks  have  more  limited 12 
 
access to cheap sources of funding but compensate for their higher costs by exploring more 
profitable market segments such as trade finance, retail lending, and credit cards. 
The  ratio  of  securities  to  assets  which  mostly  reflects  investments  in  government-related 
instruments is not significantly different between the groups, which would seem to contradict the 
statements above. However, this is due to the inclusion of Lebanon in the sample.  The Lebanese 
case is unique in many aspects, comprising a very large and private banking system (deposits of 
about 300 percent of GDP) due to large expatriate remittances and other inflows, a large public 
debt  of  150  percent  of  GDP,  and  substantial  financing  of  the  government  by  the  banks.  
Excluding Lebanon from the sample reveals that MENA state banks finance significantly more 
their governments and generate less interest income as a result. State banks hold 20.2 of their 
assets in securities, compared to only 13.9 percent for their private counterparts. 
State banks have lower cost ratios, whether measured by the ratios of overhead costs to assets or 
personal costs to assets, although the differences are not statistically significant in the last case.  
This may seem counter-intuitive, but one must bear mind that state banks are much larger and 
should enjoy stronger economies of scale as a result. The question is whether the differences in 
cost ratios should be even larger considering the differences in size or, put differently, whether 
state banks have larger cost ratios controlling for size. The fact that the ratio of personal costs to 
assets is similar in the two groups suggests that the scale effect is being reduced by other factors. 
This issue is examined in more detail in the next section by means of regression analysis, but the 
last rows of Table 5A already provide an explanation for the lower cost ratios of state banks.  
These banks have significantly higher ratios of employees per unit of assets, suggesting that they 
are not being able to exploit the potential advantages of their larger scale. Their lower cost ratios 
come essentially from lower average wages, whether measured by overhead costs per employee 
or personal costs per employee.
8 In other words,  state banks  have a much larger number of 
employees but these are likely to be lower skilled workers on average. This finding is consistent 
with their lower interest income, suggesting that state banks do not compete intensively in areas 
                                                           
8 For example, the average wage in private banks is $25,600 compared to $17,250 in state banks.   13 
 
that require more skills, or compete without the right skills and techniques and therefore are 
more exposed to financial losses.
9 
The last row of Table 5A confirms that state banks have a much higher average ratio of loan loss 
provisions to gross loans. The Bankscope database does not provide detailed information on the 
composition of loan portfolios, but this result probably reflects losses resulting from lending to 
state enterprises and favored sectors.    In this regard, state  banks  might be fulfilling their 
development mandates, whereby they  are directed to  finance projects and sectors  that may 
generate low returns or entail excessive risks, but that are  regarded as strategic or capable of 
generating positive externalities.  These losses are probably aggravated by the  own  internal 
operational deficiencies of state banks in fulfilling these mandates. 
By contrast, private banks pay higher average wages in order to attract higher -skilled workers 
and develop more sophisticated  and profitable  business lines while being able to manage the 
associated risks relatively well. At the same time, they are also able to maintain a lower ratio of 
employees to assets. Thus taken together,  these results show that  private banks are  ultimately 
able to generate higher profits compared to state banks  despite their smaller  average size, by 
exploring more profitable business lines, containing their operating costs, and managing their  
risks more effectively. 
Domestic private versus foreign private banks 
Next we analyze the differences between foreign and domestic private banks.  In 2008, there 
were 90 private banks in non-GCC MENA countries of which 45 were domestic and 45 were 
foreign.  As shown in table 5B, we find that foreign banks are significantly smaller, reflecting at 
least partly their more recent entry into banking systems in the region (see the previous section).  
Foreign banks have been more profitable than private domestic banks, as indicated by higher 
ROAs and ROEs. Although these differences in profitability are not statistically significant, this 
still suggests important efficiency differences, given that foreign banks are smaller.  Foreign 
banks also generate higher NIMs but the differences vis-à-vis private domestic banks are not 
                                                           
9 Rocha, Farazi, Khouri, and Pearce (2010) show that state banks in MENA are as involved in SME finance as 
private banks, but do not seem to have the same levels of risk management and SME lending techniques.  14 
 
significant either.  Interestingly, foreign banks enjoy lower funding costs probably because they 
can leverage internal funding markets and the parent’s balance sheet and reputation. However, 
they are not able to generate higher interest income relative to private domestic banks, despite 
holding smaller securities portfolios.  On the other hand, they generate more non-interest income 
relative to domestic banks.  These results suggest that domestic banks are more embedded in 
local credit markets, whereas foreign banks are still more involved in niche markets such as 
upscale  consumer  lending  and  non-interest  income  business  lines  such  as  foreign  exchange 
commissions, advisory services, and letters of credit.  
Foreign  banks  have  higher  cost  ratios  relative  to  domestic  banks,  a  result  that  may  seem 
surprising given their presumed sophistication although this could simply reflect their smaller 
size. Their ratio of employees to assets is higher, consistent with their modest scale, and helps 
explain  their  higher  cost  ratios.    Interestingly,  foreign  banks  pay  lower  wages  than  private 
domestic banks, but this is not sufficient to offset the higher ratio of employees to assets to 
achieve lower costs.  One possible reason why foreign banks pay lower wages is that some of the 
sophisticated and costly work is centrally executed in the head office. However, this is likely to 
change as foreign banks become better integrated into local markets. The question is whether 
foreign banks are less efficient than private domestic banks controlling for size, a question that is 
addressed in more detail in the next section.  
Listed versus non-listed banks 
In this final sub-section we compare the performance of listed banks and non-listed banks.  The 
number of listed banks increased significantly during the sample period as noted above.  In 2008 
there were 65 listed banks in the nine non-GCC countries in the sample, accounting for 61 
percent of the number of banks and 56 percent of total assets. Out of the 65 listed banks, 60 are 
private banks and 5 are state banks.   
We note that listed banks are on average smaller than non-listed banks, although the difference is 
not statistically significant (Table 5C). Listed banks are significantly more profitable, whether 
measured by  the ROA or  the ROE. For example, the ROA for listed banks  is  1.03 percent 
compared to 0.64 percent for non-listed banks. The average NIM of listed banks is higher than 
that of non-listed banks, but the difference is not statistically significant. As expected, listed 15 
 
banks  are  able  to  fund  themselves  at  lower  rates.  However,  they  also  generate  less  interest 
income  per  unit  of  asset  which  is  surprising,  especially  considering  that  they  finance  the 
government to a lesser extent. At the same time, listed banks generate much larger income from 
fees and commissions, which helps explain their higher profitability. 
Listed banks have higher cost ratios vis-à-vis non-listed banks.  Since average wages in the two 
groups are similar, this is due essentially to a higher ratio of employees to assets.  This result 
may  be  partly  explained  by  their  smaller  size,  but  could  also  be  explained  by  the  stricter 
corporate governance, disclosure and compliance requirements imposed on listed banks, which 
may  translate  into  more  staff  requirements  and  higher  costs.  At  the  same  time,  these 
requirements probably also explain why these banks are able to maintain better quality portfolios 
and lower levels of provisioning, and are ultimately able to generate higher profits despite their 
higher operating costs. 
5.2 Regression Results 
In this section we use regression analysis on a sample of annual bank observations in nine non-
GCC  MENA  countries  for  the  period  2001-08  to  elaborate  on  our  two-group  comparison 
findings. Table 6 reports the mains results while Appendix C reports additional results involving  
weighted regressions. Our weights are inversely proportional to the number of banks in a given 
country to account for differences in the number of banks per country which could skew the 
results in favor of countries with more banks. 
Our main independent variables of interest are a set of dummies: public, foreign, and listed.  By 
including  these  dummies  simultaneously,  their  regression  coefficients  need  to  be  interpreted 
relative  to  the  reference  group  of  private,  domestic,  and  non-listed  banks.  To  account  for 
confounding  factors  we  also  include  the  following  bank-level,  time-varying  controls.    As  a 
measure of bank size we use the 1-period lag of the log of total assets.  To distinguish between 
the different strategies on income-generating activities of banks, we also include the non-interest 
income to total assets.  In line with other empirical studies, to control for different asset and 
funding management approaches,  we use the  deposit  to  assets  and  loan to  assets  ratios.    In 
addition  to  bank-level  controls  we  also  include  time  and  countries  dummies  to  capture  the 
general regional trends and country-specific time-invariant conditions.   16 
 
Since the main objective of the paper is to examine the impact of ownership and listing on 
performance, we focus  on the rows  when analyzing  the different  regression results  (e.g. we 
analyze the results for the state bank dummy in different regressions). This approach also allows 
for an easier comparison with the results of the previous section. However, we also highlight 
important results in each column (i.e. in the same regression) as we examine the results.   
State bank ownership and performance 
Regressions 1 and 2 in Table 6A confirm that state banks are on average less profitable than 
private domestic, non-listed banks.  The finding is statistically significant, after controlling for 
bank size and balance sheet structures, and also holds in our weighted regressions (Appendix C).  
The ROA and ROE are 0.513 and 6.731 percentage points lower for state banks, respectively, 
controlling for our set of bank-level factors. These findings are consistent with previous research 
on bank profitability in developing countries (Micco et al (2004)) as well as MENA-specific 
research (Kobeissi and Sun (2010)). Note that these are strong results, as they show that state 
banks are significantly less profitable than the least profitable segment of private banks (i.e., 
domestic and non-listed banks), controlling for size and other factors. 
Regression  3  shows  that  state  banks  generate  smaller  net  interest  margins  vis-à-vis  private 
domestic banks although the coefficient is small and not significant.  State banks do not have 
different interest income and expense ratios either, after controlling for size and other factors.  
We confirm through regressions 6 and 7 that state banks in MENA tend to hold larger portfolios 
of government securities after controlling for size and balance sheet structures. This probably 
reflects a mandate for state banks to participate in government debt auctions and contribute to 
debt finance, regardless of their size and structure of funding. Intriguingly, this asset structure 
does not seem to have a major negative impact on interest margins, but it is possible that this 
result is partly due to accrual of interest on non-performing loans, as noted before. 
Regressions 8 – 10 confirm that state banks have higher cost ratios after controlling for their 
larger size, which helps explain their lower profitability.  Moreover, regressions 11 – 13 confirm 
that their higher cost ratios are generated by much higher ratios of employment to assets, and not 
by higher wages.  In fact, state banks pay considerably lower wages to their employees, relative 
to their private counterparts, a result that reflects their lower skills base as noted before. These 17 
 
results  show  that  state  banks  are  not  able  to  exploit  effectively  their  scale  economies.  The 
coefficients of the scale variable across different regressions show that larger banks tend to have 
significantly  lower  ratios  of  employees  to  assets  and  lower  cost  ratios,  despite  paying 
significantly  higher  wages.  This  suggests  the  existence  of  substantive  scale  economies  that 
contribute to higher returns on equity for larger banks. However, for state banks this is offset by 
a large employment base that contributes to higher cost ratios and lower profitability. 
Finally, regression 13 confirms that state banks tend to have significantly higher ratios of loan 
loss provisions to gross loans. This bank-level result is therefore consistent with country-level 
data showing that countries where state banks  command a larger market share tend to have 
higher aggregate NPL ratios (Figure 6). The need to provision for larger losses in their loan 
portfolios probably reflects a larger share of lending to state enterprises as well as lending to 
favored  sectors,  relative  to  private  banks,  combined  with  limited  capacity  to  manage  the 
associated risks.  Together with the larger operating costs, this result also helps explain the lower 
profit ratios of state banks.  Section 6 provides further discussion on the possible impact of 
policy mandates on the performance of state banks.   
Foreign bank ownership and performance 
Regressions 1 and 2 show that foreign banks are slightly more profitable than private domestic 
banks, a result that has been previously documented for developing countries as well (Demirguc-
Kunt and Huizinga (2000)), Micco et al (2004), and Kobeissi and Sun (2010)).  However, the 
dummy coefficients are not statistically significantly in our sample.  As noted before, this could 
be due to sample differences – we do not include countries such as Iran, Israel and Turkey, and 
foreign bank presence is a relatively recent phenomenon in our sample.  Thus, our tests could 
simply fail due to lack of statistical power.   
The lack of statistical power may be affecting other results as well.  As shown in regression 3, 
foreign banks generate higher interest margins but the differences vis-à-vis the reference group 
are not significant.  Intriguingly, they do not generate more interest income despite holding a 
smaller portfolio of government securities (regressions 4 - 7).  However, they benefit from lower 
funding costs. Also, they have higher ratios of employment to assets and higher cost ratios, even 
after controlling for their smaller size (regressions 8 – 11).  Note also that they have higher cost 18 
 
ratios despite paying wages which are slightly lower than those paid by private domestic banks 
(regressions  12  and  13  and  section  4).
10  These results would suggest lower levels of  cost 
efficiency for foreign banks, which is intriguing considering previous research. 
Again, these results could simply reflect lack of statistical power and suggest that it is premature 
to test the impact of foreign ownership on bank performance in non -GCC countries:  most 
foreign banks are still very small, are developing their market strategies, and have not yet been 
able to penetrate the main credit markets.   Moreover, the weak financial infrastructure of many 
non-GCC countries (including weak credit reporting systems) deprives these small foreign banks 
from essential credit information and prevents a more rapid expansion into potentially profitable 
areas such as retail lending and SME finance.
11  
Bank Listing and performance  
Regressions 1 and 2 also show that listed banks are significantly more profitable, controlling for 
size and balance sheet structures.  The ROA and ROE coefficients are 0.269 and 3.654 percent 
higher for listed banks, respectively.  Kobeissi and Sun (2010) find qualitatively similar results 
as well.  Listed banks tend to generate higher net-interest margins, due to lower interest expenses 
and higher interest income relative to total assets.  The lower funding costs could reflect a lower 
risk premium, as these banks are subject to stricter governance and disclosure requirements and 
closer market scrutiny.  The lower ratio of government securities to assets probably contributes 
to higher interest income and higher interest margins.  All the coefficients have the expected 
signs and form a coherent picture, although we also note that some of these coefficients are not 
statistically significant. 
Regressions 9 - 13 also show that listed banks tend to have higher cost ratios due essentially to 
higher  wages,  although  some  of  these  results  are  not  statistically  significant.    However,  the 
                                                           
10 In section 4 we show that foreign banks generate larger revenues from fees and commissions.  This helps explain 
why these banks have slightly higher profit ratios than domestic banks despite having higher costs.     
11 Maddedu (2010) and de la Campa (2010) examine the quality of credit information systems and collateral regimes 
in MENA and show that the region lags most other regions in the quality of financial infrastructure.  Anzoategui, 
Martinez Peria, and Rocha (2010) show that MENA banking systems seem less competitive than banking systems in 
most  other  regions,  and  that  this  is  probably  due  not  only  to  bank  regulations,  but  also  to  weak  financial 
infrastructure and less competition from non-banking sectors. 19 
 
higher costs are more than offset by higher net interest margins and higher not-interest income 
(section 4), resulting ultimately in higher profitability.  Indeed, the higher wages paid by listed 
banks could simply reflect a more skilled labor force, required to develop more sophisticated and 
profitable lines of business.  The higher profit ratios suggest that this strategy has paid off.   
Finally, we note that listed banks have lower ratios of loss loan provisions to loans, although the 
coefficient is not significant. 
All in all, these results imply that listing generates higher costs but that these costs are more than 
compensated  by  higher  revenues  and  profits.    As  noted  before,  the  stricter  governance  and 
disclosure  requirements  imposed  on  listed  banks  could  be  driving  these  results.  This 
interpretation is consistent with a recent survey of bank governance in MENA (OECD (2009)), 
which concludes that corporate governance of non-listed banks is generally poor, particularly 
those that are family controlled – these banks tend to engage heavily in connected lending and 
perform poorly as a result. This would suggest that MENA regulators should encourage or even 
mandate listing, as some countries already do. However, there is also a possibility that our results 
could be affected by selection bias: better managed and more successful banks may be precisely 
those banks that decide to list.   
Bank structures and performance 
Finally, we complement the analysis of ownership and performance by focusing briefly on the 
impact of size and balance sheet structures on performance.  We note that larger banks tend to be 
more profitable, as indicated by higher returns on assets and equity, although only the latter 
variable is statistically significant, and none of the profit indicators is significant in the weighted 
regressions (Appendix C). Larger banks tend to have lower ratios of interest income to assets and 
lower  net  interest  margins,  results  that  are  consistent  with  their  larger  securities  portfolios, 
although  most  of  the  relevant  coefficients  are  not  statistically  significant.  Most  importantly, 
larger  banks  have  lower  cost  ratios,  despite  paying  higher  wages  on  average.  This  result  is 
essentially due to a lower ratio of employees to assets, reflecting scale economies. These results 
are all statistically significant and help explain their higher profitability. 
Banks which generate higher non-interest income tend to have lower net interest margins (as 
they  focus  on  particular  markets)  and  higher  cost  ratios  but  are  still  able  to  drive  higher 20 
 
profitability.  The higher cost ratios are due both to higher wages and higher ratios of employees 
to assets. The higher wages probably reflect the need for higher-skilled staff to develop more 
sophisticated lines of business that generate substantial revenues from fees and commissions.  
The higher ratio of employees to assets is not necessarily a sign of operational inefficiency but 
rather reflects that non-interest business lines are relatively labor-intensive. 
Banks that have higher ratios of deposits to liabilities tend to have higher interest expenses and 
smaller margins, controlling for size.  This result could simply reflect the fact that banks have to 
pay  higher  interest  rates  to  attract  more  deposits,  holding  constant  their  size  (and  branch 
network). In general, changes in the ratio of deposits to liabilities by themselves do not seem 
have significant effects on cost ratios or consistent effects on profitability (the impact on ROA is 
negative while the impact on ROE is positive, although not significant), holding constant bank 
size and ownership structures.   
Finally, we find that banks with larger loan portfolios have lower profitability, controlling for 
size and other characteristics. This result is not driven by differences in margins  – although 
banks with larger loan portfolios generate more interest revenue, they also need to pay more to 
attract funding.  The lower profitability could be explained by the larger costs required to sustain 
large loan portfolios, again controlling for size.  Intriguingly, the higher ratio of loans to assets is 
associated with lower provisioning ratios.  The latter could be due to lower concentration and 
higher diversification effects in their loan books, although the result is admittedly surprising. 
6.  Is the Weaker Performance of State Banks Justified by their Policy Mandates? 
Previous sections showed that the financial performance of state banks is substantially weaker 
than that of private banks.  Among others, they exhibit lower profitability, higher costs, and 
weaker asset quality, controlling for their larger size and balance sheet structures.  The question 
is  whether  these  weaker  results  could  be  explained  or  even  justified  by  their  development 
mandates.  State banks tend to have large branch networks and may provide essential financial 
services in remote areas, where access to finance is constrained by large fixed costs.  State banks 
may also address market failures resulting from asymmetric information and poor enforcement 
of contracts that ultimately restrict access to finance in key areas, such as SME finance, housing 21 
 
finance, and investment finance.  However, the effectiveness of MENA state banks in fulfilling 
these mandates has been mixed as noted below. 
We first consider the mandate to expand access to households in remote areas.  State banks in 
MENA tend to have larger branch networks and are generally more present in remote areas with 
a smaller volume of business. Success in  expanding access in these areas could explain the 
higher ratios of employees and overhead costs over assets. Yet, we do not find evidence that 
MENA state banks have made a significant contribution to access, as measured by the number of 
deposit accounts per adult. Table 7 displays panel regression results that show the number of 
deposit accounts per adult is even negatively associated with the share of state bank assets as a 
percentage of total bank assets.  This finding persists after controlling for differences in GDP per 
capita, the degree of urbanization, and the number of branches.  Although this analysis does not 
account for the contribution of specialized institutions such as postal and agricultural banks, the 
results  suggest  that  the  large  staff  of  state  commercial  banks  is  probably  due  to  outdated 
technologies and labor redundancies (possibly reflecting the political constraints to reduce the 
size of their staff), rather than a well-articulated strategy to promote access in remote areas.
12  
Regarding SME finance, there is evidence that state banks ha ve contributed to access in  this 
important area,  although they do not seem to have developed the capacity to manage the 
associated risks.   The average share of SME lending of state banks is  similar to that of private 
banks (about 10 % of the loan portfolio), as shown in Rocha, Farazi, Khouri, and Pearce (2011).  
Moreover, they seem to have taken more risks in this area than private banks  – they are less 
selective in their strategies to target SMEs, have a lower ratio of collateralized loans to SMEs, 
and a higher share of investment loans in total SME lending. However, state banks do not seem 
to have the capacity to manage the associated risks – a lower share of state banks has dedicated 
SME units, makes use of credit scoring and conducts stress tests.
13 This lack of risk management 
capacity reflects a lower skills base (consistent with their lower wages) and has probably 
contributed to the poor financial results mentioned above, including  higher NPLs (Figure 6), 
higher levels of loan loss provisioning, and ultimately lower profitability.  
                                                           
12 This finding is also consistent with Pearce (2011). 
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Another key mandate is housing finance  for which state banks  in  Algeria, Egypt,  Morocco, 
Syria, and Tunisia took the lead to develop the market which was non-existent due to a weak 
institutional  infrastructure.  Yet  despite  initial  successes,  political  interference  in  pricing  and 
client  screening,  and  a  lack  of  competition  and  skills  led  to  instances  of  large  losses  and 
subsequent bailouts. As a result, most MENA governments have shifted strategy towards trying 
to improve enabling conditions for private suppliers to operate in this market.
14  
State banks also seem to play a key role in the provision of long-term investment finance, due to 
the lack of long-term funding, pricing benchmarks, and risk management instruments such as 
derivatives. Their role in providing investment finance seems particularly important in countries 
where they hold a large market share and serve a large number of state -owned enterprises, like 
Algeria, Libya, Syria, and  Egypt.  However, these are also the countries where the banking 
system generates the largest ratios of NPLs to total loans (Figure 6), suggesting again that the 
fulfillment  of  this  mandate  has  not  been  effective ,  either  because  of  excessive  political 
interference in investment decisions, internal operational deficiencies or both. 
Lastly,  there  is  no  compelling  evidence  that  state  banks  in  non -GCC  countries  played  a 
significant counter-cyclical role in the recent financial c risis. The potential scope for counter-
cyclical lending would seem important in countries like  Egypt, Morocco,  and Tunisia, where 
private banks lead financial intermediation but public banks still retain an important market share 
and would have the means to mitigate an excessive c ontraction of credit. However, there is no 
clear evidence that state banks  in these three countries  played this role during the crisis.  As 
shown in Table 8, in Egypt and Tunisia state banks  lost market share as their credits grew at 
lower rates than those of private banks in 2009.  In Morocco state banks gained some market 
share, as they kept expanding credit at higher rates than  those of private banks. However, it is 
questionable whether this was a countercyclical measure, as  their credit growth rates also 
declined significantly, and  in any case the  countercyclical impact of their credit activity  was 
modest at best. 
 
                                                           
14 Hassler (2011). 23 
 
7.  Summary of Findings and Policy Implications 
Main Findings 
Our main objective in this paper was to examine recent trends in bank ownership in the Middle 
East and North African region and the impact of bank ownership on bank performance.  We 
show ownership trends for the whole region but focus the statistical analysis of bank ownership 
and performance on non-GCC countries, because state ownership is more prevalent in these 
countries,  and  also  because  the  distinctions  between  public  and  private  ownership  are  more 
relevant  and  consequential  in  these  countries  as  well.  (The  stronger  interlocking  ownership 
structures in the GCC tend to blur the differences between state and private ownership and make 
statistical analysis less meaningful). We also examine the impact of bank listing on performance.  
We analyze these relationships while controlling for bank size and balance sheet structures. 
We show that the average market share of state banks remained low and stable in the GCC 
region (around 28 percent of total assets) but declined considerably in the non-GCC region, from 
56 percent of total assets in 2001 to 41 percent in 2008. State banks lost market share in most 
non-GCC  countries,  but  there  is  a  group  of  countries  where  they  still  dominate  financial 
intermediation (Algeria, Libya and Syria). There is an intermediate group of countries where 
state banks do not lead intermediation any longer, but still retain an important role, with shares 
varying from about 15 to 50 percent (Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, and Yemen).  Finally, there is 
group of countries where state banks do not exist or play a negligible role (Lebanon and Jordan).   
The market share of foreign banks declined slightly in the GCC region, from 25 to 20 percent of 
total assets between 2001 and 2008.  By contrast, the market share of foreign banks increased 
significantly in the non-GCC region, from 8 percent in 2001 to 20 percent in 2008.  However, 
most of this increase in market shares in the non-GCC region took place in recent years, and was 
due mostly to entry of new foreign banks rather than the expansion of existing foreign banks.  
Thus,  foreign  banks  remain  relatively  small  in  many  countries  and  do  not  seem  to  have 
penetrated the main domestic credit markets to any significant extent. 
The market share of listed banks increased in both the GCC and non-GCC regions.  In the GCC 
it is already very high at 90 percent of total assets.  In the non-GCC region the share of listed 24 
 
banks increased significantly, from 29 percent to 56 percent of total banking assets.  The bulk of 
listed banks are private banks, but a small number of public banks were also listed in this period.  
Regarding the main statistical findings, in line with research in other regions we find that state 
banks are significantly less profitable than private banks in the non-GCC region.  This result 
seems to be due to a combination of policy mandates and operational inefficiencies.  First, they 
finance  more  the  government  than  private  banks,  a  result  which  may  reflect  a  government 
financing mandate and that contributes to lower net interest margins. Second, they have much 
higher ratios of operating costs to assets controlling for their size and balance sheet structures.    
This result is primarily due to a much higher ratio of employees to total assets which cannot be 
explained by success in fulfilling an access mandate. Instead, state banks have not contributed to 
greater bank penetration in  remote areas, and their large employment  base  probably reflects 
outdated banking technologies and restrictions to fire excessive staff.  Finally, state banks tend to 
generate  much  larger  NPLs,  which  translate  into  larger  loan  loss  provisions  and  lower 
profitability.  These results  reflect  the imposition of  various development  mandates on state 
banks.    These  development  mandates  themselves  may  be  justified,  but  they  have  not  been 
fulfilled effectively, due to political interference, lack of risk management capacity or both.   
Foreign banks have slightly higher interest margins and profit ratios relative to private domestic 
banks, but the differences are not significant. They have higher cost ratios and higher ratios of 
employees to assets, even controlling for their much smaller size. They seem to be able to offset 
these  higher  costs  through  higher  interest  and  non-interest  income,  although  many  of  these 
results are not statistically significant. Moreover, we note that the entry and expansion of foreign 
banks is a recent phenomenon in many non-GCC countries.  Most of these banks remain small 
and apparently unable to challenge the domestic banks in their main credit markets, either due to 
the  absence  of  a  branch  network  or  a  weak  financial  infrastructure  (especially  weak  credit 
reporting systems). We note that it is probably premature to test the impact of foreign ownership 
on bank performance in most non-GCC countries. 
We also find that listed banks are more profitable than non-listed banks, controlling for their 
smaller size  and balance sheet  structures.  Listed banks  tend to finance less the government, 
generate higher net interest margins, and also generate more revenue from fees and commissions.  25 
 
They have higher cost ratios due essentially to higher wages.  This implies that they recruit and 
maintain  a  more  skilled  workforce,  required  to  develop  more  sophisticated  and  profitable 
business lines.  Therefore, they have higher cost ratios but this is more than compensated by 
larger revenues and profits. They also tend to have lower ratios of loan loss provisions, which 
reflect better credit allocation policies and asset quality, and also contribute to their profitability.   
Listed banks are subject to stricter corporate governance and disclosure requirements, and these 
factors could be driving their better performance.  These results are consistent with a recent 
survey of bank governance in MENA (OECD (2009)) that report the poor corporate governance 
of family-owned banks, especially non-listed banks, and stresses the extent of lending to close 
relatives and other connected parties that ultimately results in their poor financial performance.  
Policy Implications  
As  mentioned  in  the  introductory  sections  of  this  paper,  the  arguments  that  have  been  put 
forward to justify the continuing presence of state banks include market failures resulting from 
asymmetric  information  and  poor  enforcement  of  contracts  that  restrict  access  to  credit;  the 
provision of essential financial services in remote areas (where supply may be restricted by large 
fixed costs); and the provision of counter-cyclical finance to  prevent an excessive contraction of 
credit during a financial crisis.   
These arguments may justify the presence of state banks in some MENA countries.  In particular, 
the weak financial infrastructure in MENA (weak credit reporting systems, weak creditor rights) 
is a major factor hindering access to finance in the region and provides a rationale for policy 
interventions,  including  partial  credit  guarantees  and  the  use  of  state  banks.    Ideally,  these 
institutional and legal weaknesses should be addressed head on, and policy interventions should 
become more targeted and limited in volume, but in some countries it may take time to correct 
these deficiencies, due to technical limitations, political limitations, or both.  During this period, 
state banks may make a contribution to access in areas such as SME finance, housing finance, 
infrastructure and agriculture. 
At the same time, this paper shows that state bank interventions may come with a significant 
cost.  These banks are much less profitable than private banks, due inter alia to more government 
financing, excessive employment, larger costs, and lower asset quality.  The profitability of state 26 
 
banks may actually be inflated by interest accrual on NPLs and underprovisioning.  Therefore, 
the differences in profitability may be even larger.  In some cases, the accumulated losses may 
result  in  the  insolvency  of  these  institutions  and  a  large  bill  for  taxpayers.    Some  of  these 
deficiencies are the result of the mandates themselves, while some of them result from excessive 
political interference and the poor governance structures and operational deficiencies of these 
banks.  The question that arises is how the potential benefits of state bank interventions can be 
maximized and the potential costs minimized.  The answer to this question needs to be highly 
tailored to individual country conditions.  
There is scope for reducing the market share of state banks in the countries where they still hold 
very large shares and dominate financial intermediation, i.e., Algeria, Libya and Syria.  The main 
policy objectives that may justify the presence of state banks can be met with fewer state banks 
holding a lower market share.  Moreover, these objectives can probably be met more effectively 
under these conditions, as these banks would operate in a more transparent and competitive 
environment.  Furthermore, it is easier to clarify policy mandates and monitor the performance of 
state banks when they are fewer in number and there is a critical mass of private banks providing 
a benchmark for performance in all the main credit markets.  Note in this regard that Syria has 
been making reasonable progress in reducing the share of state banks through entry of new 
private banks, although the restructuring of the existing state banks remains a challenge. 
There  is  also  scope  for  clarifying  the  mandates,  improving  the  governance  structures,  and 
strengthening the operational efficiency of most if not all state banks in MENA.  Achieving these 
results and sustaining them over time is not a trivial task but should remain a key objective for 
MENA policy-makers, if there is a decision to preserve a role for these banks.
15  Although state 
banks may not be able to achieve the same levels of profitability of private banks due to their 
policy mandates, the results in this paper suggest t hat these  banks  could meet their  main 
development mandates more effectively if they were allowed to operate independently, and able 
to reduce the excessive employment of low skilled personnel and recruit better trained staff, able 
to implement better lending and risk management technologies.    
                                                           
15 Rudolph (2010) and Scott (2007) review the experience of well managed state banks and the legal structures and 
safeguards that must be put in place to ensure a reasonable operational and financial performance. 27 
 
MENA countries that do not have state banks may not find it necessary to create new ones, 
because they have been addressing their policy objectives through alternative and probably more 
effective policy interventions. For example, Lebanon does not have state banks but has achieved 
a relatively high share of SME lending by MENA standards through the use of partial credit 
guarantee schemes.
16 Note that these schemes have also played a counter -cyclical role in many 
countries within and outside MENA, and this is one of the arguments that have been put forward 
to justify the presence of state banks.
17 Lastly, we note that credit guarantee schemes may also be 
a preferable form of policy intervention because they provide an easier exit mechanism. 
Foreign  banks  in  MENA  remain  generally  small  but  would  probably  expand  faster  and 
contribute to more competitive and efficient  financial systems if they had access to more  and 
better credit information. As noted above and in other studies, addressing the weakness on credit 
reporting systems should remain one of the key items in the financial development agenda of 
MENA countries. This would entail both upgrading public credit registries and, especially, 
introducing  private credit bureaus able to expand coverage and improve the depth of credit 
information.
18   
Listed banks have performed better than non -listed banks, and this may be  due to the stricter 
governance standards and disclosure requirements imposed on these banks.  Introducing listing 
obligations for all licensed  banks may be  one option to improve the performance of family -
owned and non-listed banks, but the same outcome may be achieved by the bank regulator by 
simply imposing and enforcing the higher governance standards and disclosure requirements on 
all banks, listed and non-listed.
19 In this regard, an interesting question is whether the listing of 
public banks could contribute to improvements in their performance.  Unfortunately, the listing 
of MENA public banks is very recent and the sample too small to enable statistical testing, but 
                                                           
16 Rocha, Farazi, Khouri, and Pearce (2010). 
17 The IFC (2010) provides some evidence of the use of credit guarantee schemes for counter-cyclical purposes. 
18 Maddedu (2010) and Anzoategui, Martinez Peria and Rocha (2010).      
19 The OECD (2009) provides an agenda for stronger bank governance standards in the MENA region. 28 
 
this measure would probably only make sense in the context of a much broader package of 




Andrianova, S., Demetriades, P., and Shortland, A., 2010. “Is Government Ownership of Banks 
Really  Harmful  to  Growth?”.    Discussion  Papers  of  DIW  Berlin  987,  DIW  Berlin,  German 
Institute for Economic Research. 
Anzoategui, D., Martinez Peria, M., and Rocha, R., 2010. “Bank Competition in the Middle East 
and Northern Africa Region” Policy Research Working Paper 5363. The World Bank. 
Barth, J., Caprio, G., and Levine, R., 2008. “The Regulation and Supervision of Banks Around 
the World - A New Database” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Number 2588. 
Barth, J., Caprio, G., and Levine, R., 2006. Rethinking Bank Regulation: Till Angels Govern, 
Cambridge University Press. 
Ben Khediri, K., and Ben-Khediri, H., 2009. “Determinants of Islamic Bank Profitability in the 
MENA Region” International Journal of Monetary Economics and Finance 2(3-4), 409 – 426. 
Bennaceur, S., Goaied, M., 2001. “The Determinants of Commercial Bank Interest Margin and 
Profitability: Evidence from Tunisia” Frontiers in Finance and Economics 5, 106-130. 
Clarke, G., Cull, R., and Megginson, W., 2005. Journal of Banking and Finance, Special Issue 
on Bank Privatization.  
Cole,  S.,  2008.  “Fixing  Market  Failures  or  Fixing  Elections?”  American  Economic  Journal: 
Applied Economics 1(1), 219-50.   
De La Campa, A., 2010. “Increasing Access to Credit through Reforming Secured Transactions 
in  the  MENA  Region”  unpublished  manuscript  (available  at  MENA  Finance  Flagship  website: 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/MENAEXT/EXTMNAREGTOPPOVRED/0,,
contentMDK:22734614~pagePK:34004173~piPK:34003707~theSitePK:497110,00.html) 
Demirgüç-Kunt,  A.,  and  H.  Huizinga.  2000.  “Determinants  of  Commercial  Bank  Interest 
Margins and Profitability: Some International Evidence” World Bank Economic Review 13(2), 
379-408. 
Dinc, S., 2005. “Politicians and Banks: Political Influences on Government-Owned Banks in 
Emerging Countries” Journal of Financial Economics, 77(2), 453-79. 
International Finance Corporation (IFC), 2010, G20 Report: Scaling up SME Access to Finance. 
IFC, Washington DC. 
                                                           
20 We included an interactive dummy for public and listed banks, and the results indicated that public listed banks 
perform better than non-listed ones.  However, this result probably lacks statistical power due to very small sample 
of public listed banks and the short period of listing, and could simply reflect a selection bias – the public banks that 
were listed were the best performing.  29 
 
Isik,  I., Gunduz, L., and Omran, M., 2004. “Managerial and Scale Efficiency in the MENA 
Banking: A Panel Study of the Jordanian Banking Sector”.  
Khwaja, A., and Mian A., 2005. “Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms? Rent Provision 
in an Emerging Financial Market”. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120(4), 1371-1411. 
Kobeissi, N., and Sun, X., 2010. “Ownership Structure and Bank Performance: Evidence from 
the Middle East and North Africa Region” Comparative Economic Studies 52 (3), 287-323. 
Körner, T., and Schnabel, I., 2010. “Public Ownership of Banks and Economic Growth - The 
Role of Heterogeneity”  Working Paper Series  of the Max Planck Institute for Research on 
Collective Goods 2010_41.  
La  Porta,  R.,  López-de-Silanes,  F.,  Shleifer,  A.,  2002.  “Government  Ownership  of  Banks” 
Journal of Finance 57 (2), 265-301. 
Levy-Yeiati,  E.,  Micco,  A.,  and  Panizza,  U.,  2007.  “A  Reappraisal  of  State-Owned  Banks” 
Economica 7(2), 209-247.  
Madeddu, O., 2010. “The Status of Information Sharing and Credit Reporting Infrastructure in 




Micco, A., and Panizza, U., 2007. “Bank Ownership and Lending Behavior” Economics Letters 
93, 248-254. 
Micco, A., Panizza, U., and Yañez, M., 2007. “Bank Ownership and Performance: Does Politics 
Matter?” Journal of Banking and Finance 31 (1), 219–41.  
Micco,  A.,  Panizza,  U.,  and  Yañez,  M.,  2004.  “Bank  Ownership  and  Performance”  Inter-
American Development Bank, Research Department Working Paper 518 
OECD (2009). Policy Brief on Improving Corporate Governance of Banks in the Middle East 
and North Africa.  
Olson, D., and Zoubi, T., 2010. “Efficiency and Bank Profitability in MENA Countries”.  
Omran,  M.,  2007.  “Privatization,  State  Ownership,  and  Bank  Performance  in  Egypt”  World 
Development 35 (4), 714–733. 
Rocha, R., Farazi, S., Khouri, R., and Pearce, D., 2010. “The Status of Bank Lending to SMEs in 
the Middle East and North Africa Region: The Results of a Joint Survey of the Union of Arab 
Banks and the World Bank” unpublished manuscript (available at MENA Finance Flagship website: 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/MENAEXT/EXTMNAREGTOPPOVRED/0,,
contentMDK:22734614~pagePK:34004173~piPK:34003707~theSitePK:497110,00.html) 
Rudolph,  H.,  2009.  “State  Financial  Institutions  Mandates,  Governance  and  Beyond”  Policy 
Research Working Paper 5141. The World Bank, Washington DC.  
Scott, D., 2007. “Strengthening the Governance and Performance of State-Owned Financial 
Institutions” Policy Research Working Paper 4321, The World Bank, Washington, DC. 30 
 
Sufian,  F.,    Mohamad,  N.,  and  Muhamed-Zulkhibri  ,  A.,  2008.  “The  Efficiency  of  Islamic 
Banks: Empirical Evidence from the MENA and Asian Countries Islamic Banking Sectors” The 
Middle East Business and Economic Review 20 (1). 
Sapienza,  P.,  2004.  “The  Effects  of  Government  Ownership  on  Bank  Lending”  Journal  of 
Financial Economics 72 (2), 357-384. 
Turk-Ariss, R., 2008. “Financial Liberalization and Bank Efficiency: Evidence from Post-war 
Lebanon” Applied Financial Economics 18, 931–946. 
 
   31 
 
Figure 1: Share of State Banks in Total Assets (%), 1970-2005 
State banks are defined as banks in which the government is a majority shareholder. Regional shares are calculated as simple country averages of 
the share of majority government-owned bank assets to total system assets. 
 
Source:  Levy-Yeiati  et  al.  (2007).  2005  numbers  are  based  on  author’s  calculations.  Data  for  MENA  is  from 
Bankscope and for other regions is from Barth et al. (2007). MENA countries include Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Morocco, Tunisia, and Yemen. 
 
Figure 2: Share of State Banks in Total Assets (%) in MENA, 2001-08 
 
Source:  Author’s  calculations based  on  data  from  Bankscope.  GCC  countries  are  Bahrain,  Kuwait, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE.  Non-GCC private-led banking systems include Egypt, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, and Yemen.  Non-GCC state-led banking systems include Algeria, Libya, 
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Figure 3: Share of State Banks in Total Assets in MENA Countries (%),  
Averages 2001-03 and 2006-08 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Bankscope. 
 
Figure 4: Share of Foreign Banks in Total Assets (%) in MENA, 2001-08  
 
Source:  Author’s  calculations based  on  data  from  Bankscope.  GCC  countries  are  Bahrain,  Kuwait, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE. Non-GCC private-led banking systems include Egypt, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, and Yemen.  Non-GCC state-led banking systems include Algeria, Libya, 
and Syria.  
 33 
 
Figure 5: Share of Listed Banks in Total Assets (%) in MENA, 2001-08 
 
Source:  Author’s  calculations based  on  data  from  Bankscope.  GCC  countries  are  Bahrain,  Kuwait, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE. Non-GCC private-led banking systems include Egypt, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, and Yemen.  Non-GCC state-led banking systems include Algeria, Libya, 
and Syria.  
Figure 6: Non-GCC countries   
Share of State Ownership in the Banking Sector and Non-Performing Loans, 2
 
Source: % of State Ownership is based on author’s calculations from data obtained from Bankscope. NPL 






Table 1: Asset Share of Banks in MENA, by Ownership and Other Categories, 2001-2008 
State (private) banks are defined as banks in which the government (private sector) is a majority shareholder. Foreign (Domestic) 
banks are defined as banks in which foreign (domestic) entities are majority shareholders. Listed banks are defined as banks that are 
listed in a stock market. Shares are calculated as simple country averages. GCC countries are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia and UAE. Non GCC private-led banking systems include Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, and Yemen. Non-GCC 
state-led banking systems include Algeria, Libya, and Syria. 
 
 MENA  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
State Banks  41%  39%  37%  38%  36%  34%  34%  33% 
Private Banks  59%  61%  63%  62%  64%  66%  66%  67% 
          Private Domestic  42%  43%  44%  44%  46%  47%  47%  47% 
          Private Foreign  18%  18%  19%  18%  18%  20%  19%  20% 
                   Private Foreign International  8%  8%  8%  8%  8%  9%  9%  10% 
                   Private Foreign Regional  10%  10%  10%  10%  10%  10%  10%  10% 
Listed Banks  56%  58%  64%  66%  70%  75%  76%  78% 
            Listed Private Banks  49%  50%  53%  53%  55%  60%  60%  61% 
            Listed State Banks  7%  8%  11%  13%  15%  15%  16%  17% 
GCC  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
State Banks  28%  28%  28%  27%  28%  27%  28%  28% 
Private Banks  72%  72%  72%  73%  72%  73%  72%  72% 
          Private Domestic  47%  46%  47%  49%  48%  51%  52%  52% 
          Private Foreign  26%  26%  25%  24%  23%  22%  20%  20% 
                   Private Foreign International  12%  12%  12%  11%  10%  9%  8%  9% 
                   Private Foreign Regional  13%  14%  13%  13%  13%  13%  12%  11% 
Listed Banks  79%  79%  84%  85%  86%  89%  89%  90% 
            Listed Private Banks  66%  65%  67%  68%  67%  69%  68%  68% 
            Listed State Banks  13%  14%  17%  17%  20%  20%  21%  22% 
Non-GCC  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
State Banks  56%  53%  50%  52%  47%  43%  43%  41% 
Private Banks  44%  47%  50%  48%  53%  57%  57%  59% 
          Private Domestic  36%  38%  40%  38%  42%  41%  38%  39% 
          Private Foreign  8%  9%  10%  10%  11%  16%  19%  20% 
                   Private Foreign International  3%  3%  4%  4%  5%  9%  12%  12% 
                   Private Foreign Regional  5%  6%  6%  6%  6%  7%  7%  8% 
Listed Banks  29%  31%  37%  41%  45%  52%  54%  56% 
            Listed Private Banks  29%  31%  33%  32%  38%  45%  46%  48% 









Table 1 (continued): Asset Share of Banks in MENA, by Ownership and Other Categories, 
2001-2008 
State (private) banks are defined as banks in which the government (private sector) is a majority shareholder. Foreign (Domestic) 
banks are defined as banks in which foreign (domestic) entities are majority shareholders. Listed banks are defined as banks that are 
listed in a stock market. Shares are calculated as simple country averages. GCC countries are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia and UAE. Non GCC private-led banking systems are Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, and Yemen.  Non-GCC state-
led banking systems include Algeria, Libya, and Syria. 
 
Non-GCC Private-led  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
State Banks  42%  40%  39%  37%  35%  30%  29%  29% 
Private Banks  58%  60%  61%  63%  65%  70%  71%  71% 
          Private Domestic  47%  49%  49%  51%  52%  52%  49%  48% 
          Private Foreign  10%  11%  12%  12%  13%  18%  22%  22% 
                   Private Foreign International  4%  4%  5%  5%  6%  11%  15%  14% 
                   Private Foreign Regional  7%  7%  7%  7%  7%  7%  7%  8% 
Listed Banks  39%  39%  46%  53%  55%  65%  67%  66% 
            Listed Private Banks  39%  39%  41%  42%  46%  56%  58%  58% 
            Listed State Banks  0%  0%  5%  11%  9%  9%  8%  8% 
Non-GCC State-led  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
State Banks  98%  98%  97%  96%  92%  90%  90%  86% 
Private Banks  2%  2%  3%  4%  8%  10%  10%  14% 
          Private Domestic  1%  1%  1%  1%  1%  2%  2%  2% 
          Private Foreign  1%  1%  2%  3%  6%  8%  9%  13% 
                   Private Foreign International  0%  0%  1%  1%  2%  3%  3%  4% 
                   Private Foreign Regional  1%  1%  1%  2%  4%  6%  6%  9% 
Listed Banks  0%  1%  2%  3%  5%  6%  12%  14% 
            Listed Private Banks  0%  1%  2%  3%  5%  6%  7%  11% 
            Listed State Banks                    5%  3% 
Table 2: Asset Share of State Banks in Non-GCC Countries, 2001-2008 
   2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
Algeria  97%  98%  96%  95%  92%  91%  93%  90% 
Egypt  79%  77%  77%  75%  72%  58%  55%  57% 
Jordan  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0% 
Lebanon  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0% 
Libya  95%  92%  93%  97%  95%  95%  94%  94% 
Morocco  79%  81%  82%  80%  44%  43%  38%  37% 
Syria  100%  100%  100%  97%  90%  82%  74%  69% 
Tunisia 
   
53%  46%  44%  44%  42%  43% 
Yemen  31%  23%  20%  17%  16%  15%  14%  13% 
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Table 3: Definition and sources of variables used in regression analysis  
Variable   Definition   Source 
ROA  Return on average asset is the return generated from the assets financed by the bank.  Bankscope 
ROE  Return on average equity is measure of the return on shareholder funds.  Bankscope 
Net Interest Margin  This ratio is the net interest income expressed as a percentage of total assets.  Bankscope 
Interest Income to Assets   Interest income on loans + other interest income + dividend income as a percentage of assets.  Bankscope 
Interest Expenses to Assets   Interest expense on customer deposits+ other interest expense + preferred dividends paid & declared d as 
a percentage of assets. 
Bankscope 
Total Securities to Assets  Loans and advances to banks + trading securities + derivatives + available for sale securities + held to 
maturity securities + at-equity investments + other securities as a percentage of assets. 
Bankscope 
Overheads to Assets  Personnel expenses + other operating expenses as a percentage of assets.  Bankscope 
Personnel Expenses to Assets  Wages, salaries, social security costs, pension costs and other staff costs, including expensing of staff 
stock options as a percentage of assets. 
Bankscope 
Employment to Assets  Number of employees as a percentage of assets.  Bankscope and Union of Arab Banks Database 
Wage    Personnel expenses (or overheads) as a percentage of employees.  Bankscope 
Loan Loss Provisions to Gross Loans  Loan impairment charges as a percentage of gross loans.   Bankscope 
Dummy Public Ownership  This is equal to 1 if bank is majority government owned.  Bankscope,  Bankersalmanac,  Union  of  Arab 
Banks Database and banks’ websites. 
Dummy Foreign Ownership  This is equal to 1 if bank is majority foreign owned.  Bankscope,  Bankersalmanac,  Union  of  Arab 
Banks Database and banks’ websites. 
Dummy Listed  This is equal to 1 if bank is listed on a stock market.  Bankscope,  Bloomberg  and  websites  of 
national stock markets. 
Lag Total Assets (Log)  One period lag of total earning assets + cash and due from banks + foreclosed real estate + fixed assets + 
goodwill + other intangibles + current tax assets + deferred tax + discontinued operations + other assets.  
Bankscope 
Non-Interest Income to Assets  Net gains (losses) on trading & derivatives + net gains (losses) on other securities + net gains (losses) on 
assets at FV through income statement + net insurance income + net fees and  commissions + other 
operating income as a percentage of assets. 
Bankscope 
Deposits to Assets  Total  customer  deposits  +  deposits  from  banks  +  Other  deposits  and  short-term  borrowings  as  a 
percentage of assets. 
Bankscope 
Loans to Assets  Residential  mortgage  loans  +  other  mortgage  loans  +  other  consumer/retail  loans  +  corporate  & 
commercial loans + other  loans - reserve against possible losses on impaired or non performing loans as 
a percentage of assets. 
Bankscope 
Asset Share of State Banks  Share of state ownership in the banking sector.  Bankscope,  Bankersalmanac,  Union  of  Arab 
Banks Database and banks’ websites. 
Log GDP per capita  Logarithm of GDP per capita.  World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
Urban  Population  %  of  Total 
Population 
Share of population in the urban areas to total population in a country.   World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
Branches per 100,000 Adults  Number of branches of commercial banks per capita.    IMF 
Deposit Accounts per 1,000 Adults  Number of deposit accounts with commercial banks per capita.   IMF 37 
 
Table 4: Correlation Matrix of Variables used in Regression Analysis 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% NEEDS  
 

























ROE  0.73***  1   
     
   
    Net Interest Margin (Assets)  0.41***  0.29***  1 
     
   
    Interest Income to Assets  0.15***  0.13***  0.26***  1 
   
   
    Interest Expenses to Assets  -0.16***  -0.05  -
0.28*** 
0.80***  1 
 
   
    Total Securities to Assets (All Countries)  0.003  0.04  -0.02  0.52***  0.52***  1     
    Overheads to Assets  -0.10**  -0.16***  0.37***  0.10***  -0.10***  -0.09**  1   
    Personal Expenses to Assets  -0.10**  -0.28***  0.3***  0.10**  -0.10**  -0.17***  0.83***  1 
    Employment to Assets  -0.01  -0.11**  0.12**  0.05  -0.02  -0.13**  0.29***  0.5***  1 
  Wage  (Personal Expense)  0.04  0.08  -0.18**  0.31***  0.29***  0.35***  -0.04  0.03  -0.68***  1 
Wage  (Overheads)  0.02  0.05  -0.01  0.11*  0.06  0.24*  0.12*  -0.10*  -0.69*  0.93* 
Loan Loss Provisions to Gross Loans  -0.27***  -0.19***  0.03  0.03  0.05  0.03  -0.005  0.04  0.34***  -0.30*** 
Dummy Public Ownership  -0.12***  -0.11***  -0.01  -0.11***  -0.13***  0.03  -0.20***  -0.02  0.19***  -0.23*** 
Dummy Foreign Ownership  0.06  0.06  0.03  -0.14***  -0.21***  -0.31***  0.22***  0.16***  0.15***  -0.17*** 
Dummy Listed  0.15***  0.09**  -0.06  -0.07*  -0.16***  -0.29***  0.20***  0.23***  0.080*  0.01 
Lag Total Assets (Log)  -0.001  0.05  -0.05  0.04  0.03  0.17***  -0.30***  -0.23***  -0.34***  0.38*** 
Non-Interest Income to Assets  0.21***  0.12***  0.03  -0.14***  -0.15***  -0.31***  0.38***  0.37***  0.40***  -0.16*** 
Deposits to Assets  0.03  0.13***  -
0.27*** 
0.29***  0.49***  0.36***  -0.26***  -0.14***  -0.09*  0.12** 
Loans to Assets  0.07*  -0.04  0.19***  0.02  -0.10***  -0.46***  0.23***  0.40***  0.24***  -0.23*** 


























Wage  (Overheads)  1   
              Loan Loss Provisions to Gross Loans  -0.41***  1 
              Dummy Public Ownership  -0.22***  0.21***  1 
            Dummy Foreign Ownership  -0.14***  0.007  -0.34***  1 
          Dummy Listed  0.04  -0.20***  -0.27***  0.41***  1 
        Lag Total Assets (Log)  0.33***  -0.15***  0.48***  -0.24***  0.09**  1 
      Non-Interest Income to Assets  -0.23***  0.24***  -0.08**  0.25***  0.31***  -0.21***  1 
    Deposits to Assets  0.01  -0.05  -0.08**  -0.16***  -0.12***  0.13***  -0.29***  1 
  Loans to Assets  -0.18***  -0.08*  0.07**  0.15***  0.41***  0.07*  0.35***  -0.17***  1 38 
 
Table 5A: T and Rank Tests for Private vs. Public Banks in Non-GCC Region 
Tests are conducted on annual bank-level data for the period 2001-08.  Column 5 shows the p-value of a t-test which tests for the 
equality of means of the groups (allowing for inequality in variance).  Column 6 shows the p-value of the Wilcoxon ranksum test 
which tests whether the groups are samples from populations with the same distribution. Non-GCC countries are Egypt, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, and Yemen. State-led countries are Algeria, Libya, and Syria. 
 
 Variable  Private   Public  P value for t   P Value for Rank  
Total Assets  2.1E+06  8.2E+06  0.00  0.00 
ROA  0.92  0.52  0.00  0.00 
ROE  11.16  7.57  0.01  0.00 
Net Interest Margin (Total Assets)  2.27  2.25  0.82  0.89 
Total Interest Income to Assets  5.85  5.18  0.00  0.00 
Total Interest Expenses to Assets  3.59  2.98  0.00  0.00 
Non-Interest Income to Assets  1.35  1.14  0.02  0.02 
Securities to Assets (All Countries)  19.56  20.74  0.40  0.48 
Securities to Assets (Excluding Lebanon)  13.88  20.23  0.00  0.00 
OH Costs to Assets  2.00  1.58  0.00  0.00 
Personnel Expenses to Assets  1.05  1.02  0.64  0.83 
Employees to Assets  0.05  0.07  0.00  0.00 
Wage  (Personal Expense)  25.60  17.25  0.00  0.00 
Wage  (Overheads)  45.32  30.41  0.00  0.00 
Loan Loss Provisions to Gross Loans  1.59  2.88  0.00  0.00 
 
Table 5B: T and Rank Tests for Domestic (Private) vs. Foreign Banks in Non-GCC Region 
Tests are conducted on annual bank-level data for the period 2001-08.  Column 5 shows the p-value of a t-test which tests for the 
equality of means of the groups (allowing for inequality in variance).  Column 6 shows the p-value of the Wilcoxon ranksum test 
which tests whether the groups are samples from populations with the same distribution. Non-GCC countries are Egypt, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, and Yemen. State-led countries are Algeria, Libya, and Syria. 
 
Variable  Domestic   Foreign  P value for t   P Value for Rank  
Total Assets  2.3E+06  1.4E+06  0.00  0.04 
ROA  0.89  0.97  0.51  0.09 
ROE  11.10  11.54  0.71  0.88 
Net Interest Margin (Total Assets)  2.25  2.30  0.55  0.34 
Total Interest Income to Assets  6.22  5.30  0.00  0.00 
Total Interest Expenses to Assets  4.01  3.00  0.00  0.00 
Non-Interest Income to Assets  1.17  1.62  0.00  0.00 
Securities to Assets (All Countries)  23.54  13.51  0.00  0.00 
Securities to Assets (Excluding Lebanon)  16.70  11.85  0.00  0.00 
OH Costs to Assets  1.86  2.24  0.00  0.00 
Personnel Expenses to Assets  1.01  1.19  0.00  0.00 
Employees to Assets  0.05  0.06  0.00  0.00 
Wage  (Personal Expense)  27.44  21.29  0.00  0.00 
Wage  (Overheads)  49.56  38.24  0.00  0.00 





Table 5C: T and Rank Tests for Listed vs. Non-Listed Banks in Non-GCC Region 
Tests are conducted on annual bank-level data for the period 2001-08.  Column 5 shows the p-value of a t-test which tests for the 
equality of means of the groups (allowing for inequality in variance).  Column 6 shows the p-value of the Wilcoxon ranksum test 
which tests whether the groups are samples from populations with the same distribution. Non-GCC countries are Egypt, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, and Yemen. State-led countries are Algeria, Libya, and Syria. 
 
 Variable  Listed  Non-listed  P value for t   P Value for Rank  
Total Assets  2.9E+06  3.3E+06  0.20  0.01 
ROA  1.03  0.64  0.00  0.00 
ROE  11.55  9.32  0.02  0.00 
Net Interest Margin (Total Assets)  2.32  2.21  0.14  0.03 
Total Interest Income to Assets  5.57  5.93  0.01  0.00 
Total Interest Expenses to Assets  3.23  3.77  0.00  0.00 
Non-Interest Income to Assets  1.57  1.03  0.00  0.00 
Securities to Assets (All Countries)  40.01  31.70  0.00  0.00 
Securities to Assets (Excluding Lebanon)  15.86  23.94  0.00  0.00 
OH Costs to Assets  2.09  1.76  0.00  0.00 
Personnel Expenses to Assets  1.16  0.93  0.00  0.00 
Employees to Assets  0.06  0.05  0.09  0.07 
Wage  (Personal Expense)  24.76  24.55  0.87  1.00 
Wage  (Overheads)  44.14  42.10  0.37  0.52 
Loan Loss Provisions to Gross Loans  1.37  2.28  0.00  0.00 40 
 
Table 6A: Bank Ownership, Profitability, Interest Margin and Securities (Unweighted) 
Regressions are estimated via OLS at bank level for the year 2001 to 2008. Robust t statistics in brackets and bank level clustered t statistics in parenthesis. 
All regressions control for time and country dummies. ***, ** and * represent significance at 1, 5 and 10% level respectively.  
 
   1  2  3  4  5  6  7 











to Assets (All 
Countries) 
Total Securities to 
Assets (Excluding 
Lebanon) 
Dummy Public Ownership  -0.513  -6.731  -0.061  0.35  0.067  5.304  6.579 
   [2.86]***  [3.02]***  [0.48]  [1.38]  [0.41]  [2.55]**  [2.98]*** 
   (1.76)*  (2.02)**  (0.26)  (0.67)  (0.22)  (1.18)  (1.32) 
Dummy Foreign Ownership  0.04  1.333  0.107  -0.105  -0.381  -2.337  -3.71 
   [0.28]  [0.83]  [1.20]  [0.67]  [3.39]***  [2.28]**  [3.48]*** 
   (0.18)  (0.53)  (0.65)  (0.37)  (1.70)*  (1.18)  (1.73)* 
Dummy Listed  0.269  3.654  0.241  0.038  -0.221  -3.317  -1.915 
   [1.82]*  [2.70]***  [3.01]***  [0.27]  [1.96]*  [2.62]***  [1.47] 
   (1.39)  (1.99)**  (1.79)*  (0.16)  (1.19)  (1.57)  (0.91) 
Lag Total Assets (Log)  0.047  1.457  -0.025  -0.026  0.046  1.521  0.79 
   [1.08]  [2.60]***  [0.77]  [0.44]  [1.20]  [3.50]***  [1.41] 
   (0.70)  (1.91)*  (0.45)  (0.28)  (0.79)  (1.92)*  (0.74) 
Non-Interest Income to Assets  0.296  2.197  -0.219  -0.291  -0.158  -1.248  -0.706 
   [4.11]***  [3.24]***  [4.13]***  [2.76]***  [2.51]**  [2.01]**  [1.10] 
   (3.16)***  (2.63)***  (2.74)***  (2.10)**  (1.79)*  (1.38)  (0.76) 
Deposits to Assets  -0.014  0.151  -0.027  -0.01  0.025  0.02  0.133 
   [2.21]**  [1.64]  [6.00]***  [1.44]  [4.07]***  [0.36]  [2.33]** 
   (1.78)*  (1.44)  (3.68)***  (0.91)  (2.54)**  (0.20)  (1.25) 
Loans to Assets  -0.008  -0.119  0.002  0.016  0.022 
 
  
   [2.34]**  [2.73]***  [0.67]  [2.21]**  [5.73]*** 
 
  
   (1.53)  (1.94)*  (0.43)  (1.31)  (3.59)*** 
 
  
Observations  518  516  557  573  563  573  420 
R-squared  0.18  0.15  0.41  0.43  0.73  0.49  0.42 
Number of Countries  9  9  9  9  9  9  8 






Table 6B: Bank Ownership, Costs, Employment, Wages and Provisions (Unweighted) 
Regressions are estimated via OLS at bank level for the year 2001 to 2008. Robust t statistics in brackets and bank level clustered t statistics in parenthesis. 
All regressions control for time and country dummies. ***, ** and * represent significance at 1, 5 and 10% level respectively.  
 
 















Dummy Public Ownership  0.364  0.24  0.035  -9.161  -18.476  1.26 
 
[3.61]***  [3.29]***  [7.17]***  [5.84]***  [5.79]***  [2.84]*** 
 
(2.17)**  (1.88)*  (4.38)***  (3.58)***  (4.40)***  (2.12)** 
Dummy Foreign Ownership  0.268  0.194  0.008  -1.527  -2.8  -0.057 
 
[3.51]***  [3.43]***  [2.01]**  [1.45]  [1.29]  [0.27] 
 
(2.05)**  (1.80)*  (0.98)  (0.80)  (0.73)  (0.19) 
Dummy Listed  0.25  0.036  0.004  1.729  7.038  -0.32 
 
[3.05]***  [0.61]  [1.15]  [1.11]  [2.56]**  [1.54] 
 
(1.95)*  (0.42)  (0.72)  (0.70)  (1.89)*  (1.25) 
Lag Total Assets (Log)  -0.186  -0.117  -0.01  4.336  8.737  -0.031 
 
[5.80]***  [5.39]***  [10.09]***  [9.45]***  [10.02]***  [0.39] 
 
(3.75)***  (3.29)***  (5.90)***  (5.57)***  (7.09)***  (0.36) 
Non-Interest Income to Assets  0.275  0.118  0.007  2.189  1.76  0.58 
 
[6.02]***  [3.47]***  [2.54]**  [2.81]***  [1.18]  [3.25]*** 
 
(5.00)***  (2.46)**  (1.96)*  (2.99)***  (1.16)  (2.79)*** 
Deposits to Assets  -0.012  -0.0004  0.0002  -0.217  -0.69  0.044 
 
[1.82]*  [0.08]  [1.15]  [3.97]***  [4.85]***  [3.45]*** 
 
(1.53)  (0.07)  (0.73)  (2.30)**  (3.37)***  (2.98)*** 
Loans to Assets  0.006  0.004  0.0002  0.086  0.02  -0.017 
 
[2.07]**  [1.81]*  [1.82]*  [2.56]**  [0.28]  [2.03]** 
 
(1.45)  (1.23)  (1.02)  (1.44)  (0.20)  (1.63) 
Observations  575  384  387  270  384  489 
R-squared  0.4  0.5  0.55  0.71  0.66  0.38 
Number of Countries  9  9  9  9  9  9 
Number of Banks  120  92  102  77  104  115 
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Table 7: Government Ownership of Banking Sector and Access to Finance 
Regressions are estimated via OLS at country level for the year 2001 to 2009. Robust t statistics are in brackets.   
***, ** and * represent significance at 1, 5 and 10% level respectively.  
 
   1  2  3  4  5  6 
   Deposit Accounts per 1,000 Adults 
Asset Share of State Banks  -2.87  -2.3  -5.44  -4.34  -2.72  -2.36 
   [2.21]**  [6.40]***  [4.35]***  [8.43]***  [14.13]***  [11.35]*** 
Log GDP per capita 
 
176.35  392.37 
 
593.96  556.87 
  
 
[1.24]  [4.72]*** 
 
[9.85]***  [7.39]*** 
Urban population % of Total Population 
 
6.12  7.28 
 
2.1  1.21 
  
 
[1.05]  [1.88]* 
 
[0.47]  [0.27] 
Branches per 100,000 Adults 
   
-22.38 
   
7.12 
  
   
[2.79]*** 
   
[1.91]* 
Country Dummies  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  31  31  31  31  31  31 
R-squared  0.13  0.91  0.94  0.99  1  1 
Countries  9  9  9  9  9  9 
 
 
Table 8: Credit Growth of Public and Private Banks 
Average growth rates for government owned banks and private banks for 2007 to 2009. 
 
      2007  2008  2009 
Egypt  Share of Public Banks Credit to Total Credit  67%  63%  62% 
   Total Credit Growth  20%  17%  2% 
   Private Banks Credit Growth  49%  33%  4% 
   Public Banks Credit Growth  9%  9%  1% 
Morocco  Share of Public Banks Credit to Total Credit  43%  44%  46% 
   Total Credit Growth  45%  20%  15% 
   Private Banks Credit Growth  40%  16%  13% 
   Public Banks Credit Growth  51%  26%  19% 
Tunisia  Share of Public Banks Credit to Total Credit  48%  49%  46% 
   Total Credit Growth  15%  6%  7% 
   Private Banks Credit Growth  14%  5%  14% 
   Public Banks Credit Growth  17%  7%  -0.04% 43 
 
Appendix A: Number of Banks in MENA, 2001-2008 
MENA  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
Total Banks  128  135  144  151  158  169  183  172 
State Banks  25  24  27  28  27  26  28  26 
Private Banks  103  111  117  123  131  143  155  146 
          Private Domestic  69  73  76  80  83  89  96  86 
          Private Foreign  34  38  41  43  48  54  59  60 
                   Private Foreign International  11  11  15  14  15  18  20  19 
                   Private Foreign Regional  23  27  26  29  33  36  39  41 
Listed Banks  73  77  93  95  103  116  126  125 
            Listed Private Banks  66  70  82  83  91  104  113  112 
            Listed State Banks  7  7  11  12  12  12  13  13 
GCC  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
Total Banks  48  51  52  54  57  61  66  66 
State Banks  9  10  10  10  10  10  10  10 
Private Banks  39  41  42  44  47  51  56  56 
          Private Domestic  27  28  29  31  33  37  41  41 
          Private Foreign  12  13  13  13  14  14  15  15 
                   Private Foreign International  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3 
                   Private Foreign Regional  9  10  10  10  11  11  12  12 
Listed Banks  39  41  47  49  51  56  59  60 
            Listed Private Banks  32  34  39  41  43  48  51  52 
            Listed State Banks  7  7  8  8  8  8  8  8 
Non-GCC  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
Total Banks  80  84  92  97  101  108  117  106 
State Banks  16  14  17  18  17  16  18  16 
Private Banks  64  70  75  79  84  92  99  90 
          Private Domestic  42  45  47  49  50  52  55  45 
          Private Foreign  22  25  28  30  34  40  44  45 
                   Private Foreign International  8  8  12  11  12  15  17  16 
                   Private Foreign Regional  14  17  16  19  22  25  27  29 
Listed Banks  34  36  46  46  52  60  67  65 
            Listed Private Banks  34  36  43  42  48  56  62  60 
            Listed State Banks  0  0  3  4  4  4  5  5 44 
 
Appendix A (continued): Number of Banks in MENA, 2001-2008 
Non-GCC Private-led  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
Total Banks  68  74  80  78  80  84  90  82 
State Banks  7  7  10  10  10  9  10  10 
Private Banks  61  67  70  68  70  75  80  72 
          Private Domestic  41  44  46  47  47  49  51  43 
          Private Foreign  20  23  24  21  23  26  29  29 
                   Private Foreign International  8  8  9  8  9  12  14  13 
                   Private Foreign Regional  12  15  15  13  14  14  15  16 
Listed Banks  33  35  42  40  44  51  55  52 
            Listed Private Banks  33  35  39  36  40  47  51  48 
            Listed State Banks  0  0  3  4  4  4  4  4 
Non-GCC Sate-led  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
Total Banks  12  10  12  19  21  24  27  24 
State Banks  9  7  7  8  7  7  8  6 
Private Banks  3  3  5  11  14  17  19  18 
          Private Domestic  1  1  1  2  3  3  4  2 
          Private Foreign  2  2  4  9  11  14  15  16 
                   Private Foreign International  0  0  3  3  3  3  3  3 
                   Private Foreign Regional  2  2  1  6  8  11  12  13 
Listed Banks  1  1  4  6  8  9  12  13 
            Listed Private Banks  1  1  4  6  8  9  11  12 
            Listed State Banks  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  1 
Appendix B: Number of Banks in the Non-GCC Region, 2001-2008 
   2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
Algeria  6  6  7  11  10  12  12  11 
Egypt  21  21  21  21  21  22  23  22 
Jordan  10  10  10  10  11  11  11  10 
Lebanon  24  27  27  24  24  27  31  26 
Libya  5  3  4  4  5  5  5  3 
Morocco  3  3  3  3  4  4  6  6 
Syria  1  1  1  4  6  7  10  10 
Tunisia  4  5  11  12  12  12  12  11 
Yemen  6  8  8  8  8  8  7  7 45 
 
Appendix C: Bank Ownership, Profitability, Interest Margin and Securities (Weighted) 
Regressions are estimated via OLS at bank level for the year 2001 to 2008. Robust t statistics in brackets and bank level clustered t statistics in parenthesis. 
All regressions control for time and country dummies. Inverse of number of banks in a country in a given year is used as weights.  ***, ** and * represent 
significance at 1, 5 and 10% level respectively 
 
   1  2  3  4  5  6 












Dummy Public Ownership  -0.281  -4.844  0.113  0.622  0.144  6.688 
   [1.88]*  [2.50]**  [0.77]  [2.26]**  [0.91]  [2.95]*** 
   (1.10)  (1.65)  (0.44)  (1.14)  (0.50)  (1.35) 
Dummy Foreign Ownership  -0.026  -0.069  -0.025  -0.156  -0.372  -3.468 
   [0.18]  [0.04]  [0.22]  [0.79]  [2.78]***  [3.08]*** 
   (0.11)  (0.03)  (0.13)  (0.42)  (1.39)  (1.54) 
Dummy Listed  0.245  4.319  0.291  0.206  -0.05  -1.503 
   [1.72]*  [2.54]**  [2.72]***  [1.19]  [0.46]  [0.99] 
   (1.32)  (2.07)**  (2.37)**  (0.82)  (0.28)  (0.74) 
Lag Total Assets (Log)  -0.035  0.093  -0.052  -0.074  0.032  1.438 
   [0.68]  [0.10]  [1.33]  [1.08]  [0.78]  [2.88]*** 
   (0.50)  (0.09)  (0.85)  (0.65)  (0.49)  (1.48) 
Non-Interest Income to Assets  0.265  2.04  -0.271  -0.386  -0.221  -1.294 
   [3.86]***  [2.78]***  [4.54]***  [3.35]***  [3.18]***  [1.81]* 
   (3.01)***  (2.22)**  (2.93)***  (2.53)**  (2.31)**  (1.24) 
Deposits to Assets  -0.007  0.291  -0.021  0.001  0.031  0.134 
   [0.95]  [2.19]**  [4.01]***  [0.11]  [4.80]***  [2.20]** 
   (0.81)  (2.03)**  (2.87)***  (0.07)  (2.84)***  (1.37) 
Loans to Assets  -0.008  -0.069  0.002  0.011  0.018    
   [2.09]**  [1.45]  [0.51]  [1.32]  [4.31]***    
   (1.40)  (1.17)  (0.32)  (0.78)  (3.06)***    
Observations  517  515  556  572  562  572 
R-squared  0.2  0.21  0.46  0.47  0.72  0.48 
Number of Countries  9  9  9  9  9  9 
Number of Banks  118  119  117  120  118  117 
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Appendix C (continued): Bank Ownership, Costs, Employment, Wages and Provisions (Weighted) 
Regressions are estimated via OLS at bank level for the year 2001 to 2008. Robust t statistics in brackets and bank level clustered t statistics in parenthesis. All 
regressions control for time and country dummies. Inverse of number of banks in a country in a given year is used as weights.  ***, ** and * represent 
significance at 1, 5 and 10% level respectively.  
 















Dummy Public Ownership  0.375  0.204  0.039  -8.368  -16.895  1.405 
   [3.38]***  [2.83]***  [8.32]***  [5.82]***  [4.59]***  [2.94]*** 
   (2.22)**  (1.73)*  (5.26)***  (3.64)***  (4.40)***  (2.09)** 
Dummy Foreign Ownership  0.204  0.126  0.012  -1.035  -3.801  0.304 
   [2.09]**  [1.75]*  [3.08]***  [0.88]  [1.51]  [1.22] 
   (1.31)  (1.03)  (1.62)  (0.45)  (0.95)  (0.84) 
Dummy Listed  0.288  0.065  0.003  0.893  3.667  -0.6 
   [2.50]**  [0.77]  [0.69]  [0.77]  [1.28]  [2.12]** 
   (1.96)*  (0.64)  (0.56)  (0.58)  (1.22)  (1.73)* 
Lag Total Assets (Log)  -0.161  -0.118  -0.011  4.078  9.214  0.067 
   [3.01]***  [3.13]***  [8.31]***  [9.20]***  [7.51]***  [0.72] 
   (2.43)**  (2.55)**  (5.23)***  (6.50)***  (6.46)***  (0.61) 
Non-Interest Income to Assets  0.285  0.101  0.004  1.802  3.47  0.404 
   [5.81]***  [2.70]***  [1.50]  [2.58]**  [1.73]*  [2.67]*** 
   (4.78)***  (2.09)**  (1.13)  (2.98)***  (1.65)  (2.19)*** 
Deposits to Assets  -0.012  0.003  0.0003  -0.252  -0.794  0.046 
   [1.44]  [0.73]  [1.86]*  [4.01]***  [4.40]***  [3.35]*** 
   (1.28)  (0.61)  (1.20)  (2.32)**  (3.44)***  (2.89)*** 
Loans to Assets  0.007  0.004  0.0002  0.029  -0.035  -0.009 
   [1.98]**  [1.87]*  [1.83]*  [1.05]  [0.58]  [0.91] 
   (1.37)  (1.28)  (1.03)  (0.67)  (0.43)  (0.71) 
Observations  574  384  387  270  384  488 
R-squared  0.41  0.52  0.57  0.73  0.65  0.43 
Number of Countries  9  9  9  9  9  9 
Number of Banks  120  92  102  77  104  115 
 